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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SUEDEEN G. KELLY* AND MARILYN C. O'LEARY**

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this section of the Survey is to review those cases
decided during the Survey year which changed or clarified administrative
law in New Mexico or decided issues of first impression.' The article is
organized into two main topics: (1) the exercise of administrative authority
and (2) judicial review. 2
Under the first topic, there were significant cases clarifying the law on
adequacy of administrative findings and the process of proof. The highlights included the pronouncement of a new standard for change of agency
policies, a decision holding that a telephonic hearing meets all due process
requirements, and a dissent calling for retreat from the "legal residuum
rule" in New Mexico. Under the second topic, judicial review, the court
once again announced and applied the usual standards, but in one case
deviated from them without much helpful explication. The supreme court
also decided three cases in which it discussed the unique constitutional
standard for review of State Corporation Commission decisions.
*Commissioner, New Mexico Public Service Commission; B.A., University of Rochester, 1973;
J.D., Cornell Law School, 1976.
**Commission Counsel, New Mexico Public Service Commission; B.A., St. Mary's College,
Notre Dame, Ind., 1962; M.A., University of New Mexico, 1974; J.D., University of New Mexico
School of Law, 1981.
1. Authors' Note: The article as originally written provided an analysis of all the year's administrative law decisions. The authors were required to cut the article substantially to meet page limits
imposed by the New Mexico Law Review. Therefore, the resulting article only highlights those
cases which changed or clarified the law or decided issues of first impression.
2. Past Surveys have included an additional topic, Authority of Agencies to Act. This article does
not include an Authority of Agencies to Act section; however, there were two cases decided during
the Survey year on this topic. In Livingston v. Ewing, 98 N.M. 685, 652 P.2d 235 (1982), the
supreme court upheld the validity of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-13(C) (Cum. Supp. 1982) in the face
of a challenge that it impermissibly delegates legislative authority. This decision is consistent with
state and federal cases which rarely invalidate statutes on this ground. W. Gellhorn, C. Byse & P.
Strauss, Administrative Law 96 (7th ed. 1979). But see State v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d
1069 (1957), a prominent exception to the rule. In Kent Nowlin Constr., Inc. v. Environmental
Improvement Div., 99 N.M. 294, 296, 657 P.2d 621, 623 (1982), the second case concerning
authority of agencies to act, the court voided certain regulations issued to enforce the New Mexico
Occupational Safety and Health Act as "beyond the Board's authorized powers." The court relied
solely on rules of statutory construction, surprisingly ignoring the agency's interpretation of its statute
and any inquiry into the purpose of the law.
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II. THE EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

A. Rules and Rule-Making
An agency regulation has the force and effect of law and is binding
3
upon the agency that issues it. The corollary of this doctrine is that an
agency action taken in violation of its rule will be invalidated 4by a court,
particularly if the abridged rule is intended to benefit a party. This point
was made forcefully by the court of appeals in Taylor v. Department of
Human Services.' Taylor was a direct appeal of a Department decision
to reduce the plaintiff's food stamp allotment without citing a reason for6
the reduction. Lack of such notice is contrary to Department regulations. 7
Citing its decision in Hillman v. Health and Social Services Department,
the court reversed the Department's decision for failure to follow its own
regulations and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate Taylor
at her original food stamp allotment until the Department could give her
8
a hearing "according to law." The court did not discuss the nature of
the violated regulation. Nevertheless, it is clear that the regulation is one
which provides a procedural safeguard to an important benefit, and that
the courts will require it to be strictly followed by the agency.
B. Adjudications
In State of New Mexico, ex rel. New Mexico State Highway Department
v. Silva,9 the court of appeals examined the adequacy of the findings of
fact given by the State Personnel Board to support its decision that the
State Highway Department had dismissed Silva without just cause. The
Department argued on appeal that the Board's findings did not support
this conclusion. The court disagreed. Although it implied that the Board's
0
decision should have spelled out more findings of ultimate fact,' the
court reviewed the evidentiary findings and found them to be sufficient
3. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
4. Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 629, 630 (1974).
5. 98 N.M. 314, 648 P.2d 353 (Ct. App. 1982).
6. 7 C.F.R. § 273.13 (a) (1983); Human Services Department ISD Manual, §441.24 (1982).
7. 92 N.M. 480, 590 P.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1979).
8. 98 N.M. at 315, 648 P.2d at 354.
9. 98 N.M. 549, 650 P.2d 833 (Ct. App. 1982).
10. Professor Davis has defined an ultimate fact as:
An ultimate fact is usually expressed in the language of the statutory standard.
Examples: the rate is reasonable; the applicant is fit, willing and able to provide
service ...
[Tlhe basic findings are those on which the ultimate finding rests; the basic findings
are more detailed than the ultimate finding but less detailed than the summary of
the evidence.
K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 16.06 (1958).
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to support the decision "because a fair construction of all the findings
justifies the board's conclusion."" The court followed a reasonable path
by placing substance over form to determine that the opinion sufficiently
informed the reader of the reasons why the Board reached its decision in
the face of conflicting evidence.
Another important issue in agency adjudication is the extent to which
an agency must adhere to its established policies and precedents. The
general rule is that an agency seeking to divert from a previous position
must provide a reasoned explanation for its action so that the reviewing
court may understand the basis for the agency's action and, thus, be able
to judge the consistency of that action with the agency's mandate.' 2 This
year, the New Mexico Supreme Court had the occasion to rule on the
standard which New Mexico agencies must follow when changing a
previously announced position. In General Telephone Company of the
Southwest v. Corporation Commission,'3 the court took an extremely
narrow view of an agency's ability to change its policies. In this case,
General Telephone Company of the Southwest (GTSW) sought a rate
increase from the State Corporation Commission (SCC). To justify the
request, GTSW calculated its last year's cash working capital under a
method approved and used by the SCC in prior telephone rate cases. In
this case, however, the SCC staff proposed the use of a different method
for determining working capital. The SCC adopted the staff's proposal.
On appeal, GTSW contended that choosing the staff's method was arbitrary and capricious, "in that it radically departs from past practice
without proper notice or without reasonable justification in the record." "4
The supreme court agreed, holding that the SCC is required to give prior
notice before it can change its policy. "5This holding is a new restriction
on the Commission's adjudicatory authority that is not in accord with the
generally accepted standards governing an agency's ability to change its
policies. 6 The supreme court apparently was concerned about the ret1I. 98 N.M. 549 at 554, 650 P.2d 833 at 838.
12. A settled course of agency behavior results in a presumption that this behavior best carries
out the Legislature's policies. Therefore, the agency must explain a departure from these norms.
The agency may decide, for example, that changed circumstances warrant a change, or that a specific
case before it requires that the rule not be applied. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973).
13. 98 N.M. 749, 652 P.2d 1200 (1982).
14. Id. at 755, 652 P.2d at 1206.
15. Id. See Southern Union Gas Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Comm'n, 84 N.M. 330, 503
P.2d 310 (1972), and Hobbs Gas Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Comm'n, 94 N.M. 731, 616
P.2d 1116 (1980), which the court inappropriately cited as precedent for its broad holding in this
case. Neither Southern Union nor Hobbs Gas Co. required prior notice to change policy. Southern
Union required "evidence of changed circumstances." 84 N.M. at 333, 503 P.2d at 313. Hobbs
Gas Co. spoke of "substantial evidence" to sustain a change. 94 N.M. at 735, 616 P.2d at 1120.
16. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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7
roactive effect of the Commission's change in policy in this case. If so,
8
the court should have examined the policy change in that context, and
not announced what appears to be a general rule that policy changes only

can be made with prior notice to the parties.
There are three problems with this restriction. First, policy changes9
announced in an adjudication do not necessarily have retroactive effect.'
Second, under traditional administrative law principles, a retroactive effect is not necessarily fatal to the validity of a change in policy.2 Third,

retroactivity without prior notice is quite accepted in our judicial system.

As the Supreme Court announced in Securities and Exchange Commission

v. Chenery Corporation, "every case of first impression has a retroactive
effect whether the new principle is announced by a court or by an administrative agency. "21

C. Access to Information
Kent Nowlin Construction, Inc. v. EnvironmentalImprovement Division
22
of the New Mexico Health and Environment Department concerned the
agency's desire to take testimony of Nowlin's employees without the
presence of Nowlin or his counsel. The district court granted the Environmental Improvement Division's (EID) request for an order to take
testimony of the employees by deposition in this manner, but the supreme
court reversed. The court found that the New Mexico Rules of Civil
Procedure provide that all parties to an action must receive notice and
be afforded the opportunity to attend depositions. The court held that EID
was bound by these rules because Section 12-8-15 of the New Mexico

Administrative Procedures Act requires that administrative depositions be

17. The policy at issue in the case was how GTSW would be allowed to determine its working
capital for purposes of a rate increase. The burden is on the company to establish the reasonableness
of any method it proposes to use. Therefore, it cannot really be said that the Commission has adopted
a policy on such an issue, but that the Company has in the past shown the method it proposed to
use to be reasonable.
18. The traditional test is to balance the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard
against the public interest in implementing the more equitable policy. Securities and Exch. Comm'n
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). See also Retail Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.
1972), which enumerates factors to be considered in the balancing test.
19. For example, policy changes could be explicitly announced to take effect prospectively. The
opinion does not preclude this from its holding.
20. See supra note 18.
21. 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). Given the unique nature of state supreme court review of Corporation Commission decisions, see infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text, it might be argued
that the holding in this case is limited to Corporation Commission procedures. Nevertheless, the
possibility that the holding in this case might be applied to legislatively created agencies so concerned
the New Mexico Public Service Commission that it subsequently had its statute amended to remove
it from the prior notice restriction on change of policy. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 62-6-14 (C) (Cum.
Supp. 1983).
22. 99 N.M. 294, 657 P.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1982).
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taken as provided by law.23 The court ruled, therefore, that agencies must
use depositions in the same manner as private civil litigants.
D. Opportunity to be Heard
State of New Mexico ex rel. Human Services Department v. Gomez24
was a case of first impression involving due process rights in an agency
adjudicatory process.25 In Gomez, the supreme court adopted the dissenting opinion of Judge Wood of the court of appeals and held that a
telephonic hearing26 regarding termination of benefits was not a per se
violation of due process.2 7 Judge Wood reached his decision in three
steps. He first cited Goldberg v. Kelly,2" and pointed out that the alleged
defect of a telephonic interview, i.e., that the petitioner is not observed,
is not an element listed in that opinion as being required in a pre-ter-

23. It should be noted that the New Mexico Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to
EID. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-8-2(A) (1978).
24. 99N.M. 261,657 P.2d 117 (1982); See also 22 N.M. St. B. Bull. 51 (Jan. 20, 1983)adopting
the dissenting opinion issued in Gomez v. State of N.M. ex rel. Human Services Dep't, 21 N.M.
St. B. Bull. 1470 (Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1982), which was later published at 22 N.M. St. B. Bull. 160
(Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1983).
25. Two other cases decided last year also dealt with due process issues. In Livingston v. Ewing,
98 N.M. 685, 688, 652 P.2d 235, 238 (1982), the supreme court held that "there is no fundamental
right to notice and hearing before the adoption of a rule." This is consistent with long-standing
federal and state precedent. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
Another case, Atencio v. Board of Educ. of Penasco Indep. School Dist. No. 4, 99 N.M. 168, 655
P.2d 1012 (1982), is also of some interest. The United States District Court of New Mexico certified
to the New Mexico Supreme Court the question of whether "a certified school instructor who has
previously acquired tenure rights as a certified school instructor with the public school district lose[s]
those tenure rights as a result of being re-employed for the next consecutive school year as a certified
school administrator?" Id. at 169, 655 P.2d at 1013. The court answered the question in the affirmative. The court also found that Mr. Atencio did not retain a property interest as a tenured certified
school instructor when he voluntarily forfeited that position to become a certified school administrator.
The significance of these holdings is that the plaintiff could be denied reemployment as a certified
school instructor without a hearing.
26. The purpose of telephonic hearings in New Mexico is to reduce the cost and energy use
otherwise incurred by hearing officers travelling around the state to hold hearings. Corsi, Introduction
to the Symposium on Empirical Research in Administrative Law Part I, 31 Ad. L. Rev. 443, 486
(1979).
27. The majority opinion of the court of appeals held to the c6ntrary, citing S. Buchsbaum &
Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 153 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1946), supp. opinion, 160 F.2d 121 (1947);
United States v. Raddatz, 529 F.2d 1976 (7th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Dental Products Co., 168 F.2d
516 (7th Cir. 1948); Shawley v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Wis. 2d 535, 114 N.W.2d 872 (1962);
Trzebiatowski v. Jerome, 24 I11.2d 24, 179 N.E. 2d 622 (1962); Gomez v. State of N.M. ex rel.
Human Serv. Dep't, 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1470, 1471 (Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1982). The dissent
criticized these cases as being only marginally supportive. Most of the cases relied on by the majority:
(a) were concerned with a change in the hearing officer during the course of the hearing and (b)
considered demeanor as a part of the constitutional right to confrontation. 99 N.M. at 269, 657 P.2d
at 125.
28. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a recipient of welfare benefits is entitled to a hearing prior
to the termination of those benefits).
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mination hearing.29 Next, he found that "demeanor" is not an aspect of
3
the constitutional right of confrontation as interpreted in New Mexico. "
He also found that the United States Supreme Court "has never held that
'demeanor' is an aspect of the constitutional right of confrontation. "31
Finally, Judge Wood examined the particular circumstances of this case
and determined that Gomez' demeanor was not necessary for the hearing
to be conducted in a "meaningful manner." 32 Although the decision in
this case finds that there is no blanket right to observation of demeanor
in a post-termination hearing, it leaves open the possibility that there may
be such a right in a case where the credibility of the witness is an issue.
The majority opinion of the court of appeals would have found a blanket
due process right to observation of demeanor.33 Much of the legal precedent relied on by both the majority and dissent of the court of appeals
was correctly distinguished by the other." The supreme court, therefore,
should have provided better reasoning in support of its decision, including, perhaps, a discussion of the underlying policy issues not mentioned
in the court of appeals' opinion.35
29. The majority opinion of the court of appeals criticized this point, arguing that because the
instant case is involved with a post-termination procedure, not a pre-termination hearing, Goldberg
has no bearing upon the case. 21 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 1473.
30. Neither the defendant nor the majority in the court of appeals disagreed with this point, but
they argued that it is not relevant to this case because in a fair hearing petitioner's due process rights
are not similar to a witness's sixth amendment rights.
31. 99 N.M. at 268, 657 P.2d at 124.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 28.
34. See supra notes 28-31.
35. For example, there was no discussion of the importance of the perception of fairness by the
person whose benefits are being terminated. See L. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 Harv. Civ.
Rights--Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 269 (1975), who argues that this factor should be considered in deciding
due process bounds. Nor was there any discussion of the importance of the government's reason
for instituting telephonic hearings. The court also did not research the trend in other states toward
telephonic hearings. See, e.g., Corsi & Hurley, Attitudes Toward the Use of the Telephone in
Administrative Fair Hearings: The California Experience, 31 Ad. L. Rev. 247 (1979). The authors
explain that many California state agencies have adopted telephonic hearings as an improvement on
hearings where the parties appear in person before a hearing examiner but do not appear together.
36. Board of Ed. of Alamogordo Public School Dist. No. I v. Jennings, 21 N.M. St. B. Bull.
1352 (Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1982) is also of some interest because it clarifies the process of proof used
in de novo hearings held by the State Board of Education in reviewing local board decisions. In
Jennings, the court held that the State Board may reject the findings and conclusions of its hearing
officer who handled the de novo review and make a final decision without taking new evidence.
This refinement of the law is consistent with.Bertrand v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ. 88 N.M.
611, 544 P.2d 1176 (Ct. Ap. 1975), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 5,546 P.2d 70 (1976), which holds that
the State Board may take new evidence iP'it wishes, and Board of Educ. v. New Mexico State Board
of Educ., 88 N.M. 10, 536 P.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1975), which holds that the State Board is not
compelled to follow the local board's decision even if the local board's decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
37. 99 N.M. 198, 656 P.2d 861 (1982).
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E. The Process of Proof
Two cases dealt with the process of proof in administrative proceedings. 36 In re Donaldo A. Martinez, District Judge,37 concerned a proceeding of the New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission. The
Commission conducted an investigation and an extensive hearing on the
complaints of judicial misconduct against the judge, and filed its recommendation with the supreme court. Under article XI, section 32 of the
New Mexico Constitution, the supreme court is required to review the
Commission's record of the proceedings, but then make its own independent decision on the merits. The court declared that the complaint
would have to be proved by "clear and convincing evidence." 38 In this
case, and future cases of this kind, this choice of a standard of proof
seems appropriate. It is not as strict as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard used in criminal prosecutions, but is stricter than the civil preponderance of the evidence standard.39
In Chavez v. Employment Security Commission," the supreme court
reaffirmed the vitality of the "legal residuum rule" in New Mexico. 4
The issue on appeal in Chavez was whether there was substantial evidence
to support the Employment Security Commission's determination that
Ms. Chavez was discharged from her employment for misconduct and,
therefore, not entitled to unemployment compensation. The court found
that the testimony favoring the Commission was hearsay, and given the
absence of "legally competent" evidence in favor of the Commission,
the court reversed its finding.
Chavez is particularly noteworthy for its well-reasoned dissent by Justices Payne and Easley. The Justices noted that New Mexico adopted the
legal residuum rule in Young v. Boardof Pharmacy,42 in which the license
of a pharmacist was in question. The Young court held that where a
person's livelihood is at stake, the legal residuum rule will be applied.
The application of this rule was extended in Trujillo v. Employment Security Commission,43 which involved a dispute about unemployment com38. 99 N.M. at 193, 656 P.2d at 866.
39. The New Mexico Supreme Court in Martinez relied upon In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 308
(Alaska 1975), which reasoned that this stricter standard should be used because a proceeding to
deprive one of public office is of a "serious nature." 99 N.M. at 193, 656 P.2d at 866.
40. 98 N.M. 462, 649 P.2d 1375 (1982).
41. The legal residuum rule requires a reviewing court to set aside an administrative finding
unless the finding is supported by evidence which would be admissable in a jury trial. Davis,
Administrative Law § 16:6 (2d ed. 1980). For additional discussion of this rule, see Utton, The Use
of the Substantial Evidence Rule to Review Administrative Findings of Fact in New Mexico, 10
N.M.L. Rev. 103, 109 (1979-80).
42. 81 N.M. 5,462 P.2d 139 (1969).
43. 94 N.M. 343, 610 P.2d 474 (1980).
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pensation. The Justices noted, however, that the legal residuum rule is
now largely abolished in the United States. They agreed with the observation of Professor Davis that "rejection of the residuum rule does not
mean that an agency is compelled to rely on incompetent evidence; it
means only that the agency and the reviewing court are free to rely upon
the evidence if in the circumstances they believe that the evidence should
be relied upon. "44 The dissent stated that the loss of a professional license,
as in Young, should not be equated with the "loss of a few hundred dollars
in unemployment compensation" as in this case. 45 The dissent called upon
the court to reverse Trujillo in this case or in the earliest subsequent case
that comes before the court.
F. The Decision Making Process
In Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Corporation
Commission,46 the supreme court announced that prejudgment of a case
by a commissioner would have serious consequences. On appeal, Mountain Bell raised the question whether certain statements made by several
of the three commissioners before, during, and after the hearing amounted
to a specific prejudgment of the case or otherwise exhibited improper
bias. 47 The court found it need not answer this factual question because48
it was judging independently the reasonableness of the order on appeal.
Nevertheless, the court held that in the future, comments by a commissioner which constitute prejudgment may constitutionally invalidate the
ensuring order of the Commission. An invalid Commission order means
that the entire rate increase requested by the company automatically would
go into effect.49
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Review5"

A. Scope of
A reviewing court in most cases is required to uphold the decision of
an administrative agency "unless the decision was (1) arbitrary, capricious
44. 98 N.M. at 466, 649 P.2d at 1379 (citing 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 16:6 (2d ed. 1980)).
45. 98 N.M. at 467, 649 P.2d at 1380.
46. 99 N.M. 1, 653 P.2d 501 (1982).
47. 99 N.M. at 7, 653 P.2d at 507. For example, on a radio show prior to the hearing on Mountain
Bell's rate increase request one commissioner stated that although Mountain Bell had sought $48
million, the Commission staff consultant recommended no more than $29 million and the commissioner himself said that he thought "it will probably be lower than that." Id.
48. 99 N.M. at 7, 653 P.2d at 507; see also infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text, which
discuss the nature of this review.
49. See N.M. Const., art. XI, § 8.
50. One sub-topic of judicial review not discussed in the text is limitations on review through
the doctrines of exhaustion and primary jurisdiction. In one case decided this year, Gonzales v.
Whitaker, 97 N.M 710, 643 P.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1982), the plaintiffs argued that the New Mexico

Winter 1984]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

or an abuse of discretion; (2) not supported by substantial evidence; or
(3) otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 In upholding a determination
of the deciding body, generally the reviewing court articulates the test
without analysis and then rules that the decision below was not arbitrary
or capricious, was not an abuse of discretion, was supported by substantial
evidence, and was lawful.52 Cases upholding decisions on these grounds,
therefore, generally do not afford useful analysis.
1. Questions of Law: The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
This year, however, one case specifically discussed and set out the test
for whether a decision is arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with
law. In Saenz v. New Mexico Department of Human Services,53 Saenz
challenged the denial by the New Mexico Department of Human Services
(DHS) of temporary disability benefits. Saenz" application for assistance
was denied based on the testimony of two doctors. After notification of
denial, he applied for a fair hearing, which was held six months after
denial of benefits. Before the fair hearing, the hearing examiner sent
Saenz two letters telling him to mail immediately to the examiner any
documents Saenz wanted considered at the hearing. Although Saenz did
not do so, he did submit a report at the hearing which was admitted into
evidence. The document was a medical report by a third doctor and a
consequent United States Social Security Department decision ruling that
appellant was disabled. The hearing officer accepted the report into evidence, but the record showed that the original application was denied on
the basis of the reports of the two doctors. 54 All parties agreed that DHS
did not consider the third doctor's report even though it was introduced
and accepted into evidence. Appellant claimed that because the report
was not considered, the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not in
accordance with the law.
The court of appeals agreed. The court defined arbitrary and capricious
as "that action which is unreasonable or does not have a rational basis
and . . . is a result of an unconsidered, wilful and irrational choice
Environmental Improvement Agency (EIA) had primary jurisdiction over their complaint that a dairy,
already approved by EIA, was a nuisance. The court disagreed, holding that the agency has already
exercised whatever primary jurisdiction it held. This decision ensures that the law of nuisance will
continue to be developed by the courts.
51. State of N.M. ex rel. Highway Dep't v. Silva, 98 N.M. 549, 550, 650 P.2d 833, 834 (Ct.
App. 1982).
52. Id. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Jennings, 98 N.M. 602, 608, 651 P.2d 1037, 1043 (Ct.
App. 1982). For a discussion of evidence in the record which meets the standard, see Kerr-McGee
v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 98 N.M. 240, 647 P.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1982).
53. 98 N.M. 805, 808, 653 P.2d 181, 184 (Ct. App. 1982).
54. Id.
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of conduct and not the result of the 'winnowing and sifting' process.""5
The court found that the decision by DHS in this case was arbitrary and
capricious because it did not consider all of the evidence submitted to it.
The arbitrary and capricious standard relates to the overall process in
which the facts are accepted and considered. Although one treatise says
that under the arbitrary and capricious test the court must uphold agency
decision if there is any rational basis for the decision,56 New Mexico
courts use the rule to test whether proper legal standards were applied or
whether fair procedures were accorded.57 Applying this rule in this case,
the court reached the correct decision. A hard and fast rule that an agency
is required to admit and consider all admissible evidence presented to it,
regardless of the stage of the hearing process, however, could work a
hardship on the agency and distort the decision-making process. Such a
rule would require an agency to consider complicated and technical evidence without time or resources for the analysis necessary for reasoned
decision-making, and would subvert the administrative process.
2. The Substantial Evidence Standard
The substantial evidence test was 'explained by the court in Baca v.
Employment Services Division of the Human Services Departmentof New
Mexico 8 as follows:
(1) that substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2)
that on appeal all disputed facts are resolved in favor of the successful
party, with all reasonable inferences indulged in support of a verdict,
and all evidence and inferences to the contrary disregarded; (3) and
although contrary evidence is presented which may have supported
a different verdict, the appellate court will not weigh the evidence
or foreclose a finding of substantial evidence. 59
Implicit in the Baca test is the presumption of correctness in favor of the
deciding agency.
One case this year, New Mexico Department of Human Services v.
Tapia," discussed the "whole record" variation of the substantial evidence
standard.61 DHS decided after a hearing that the county correctly ter55. Id. (citing Garcia v. Human Serv. Dep't, 94 N.M. 178, 608 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd,
94 N.M. 175, 608 P.2d 151 (1980)).
56. 5 J.Mezines, J.Stein & J.Gruff, Administrative Law, §42-02 (1983).
57. Saenz v.New Mexico Dep't of Human Serv., 98 N.M. 805, 808, 654 P.2d 181, 184 (Ct.
App. 1982).
58. 98 N.M. 617, 651 P.2d 1261 (1982).
59. Id. at 619, 651 P.2d at 1263 (citing Toltec Int'l v. Ruidoso, 95 N.M. 82, 84, 619 P.2d 186,
188 (1980)).
60. 97 N.M. 632, 642 P.2d 1091 (1982).
61. Browde, Administrative Law, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 1, 68 (1982).
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minated Tapia's benefits. The court of appeals reversed, holding that DHS
failed to meet its burden of proof, and the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals. The supreme court explained that under the statute,62
the court of appeals erred in ignoring a report in the record which provided
sufficient evidence to uphold DHS's decision. The court of appeals should
have considered all of the evidence in the record to determine whether
DHS's decision could be upheld.
The supreme court's reasoning in Tapia shows the interrelation of the
record as a whole review and the substantial evidence standard: (1) evidence supporting the decision must be substantial when viewed in the
light furnished by the record in its entirety, but (2) substantiality is still
measured in the manner explained in Baca. The latter point can be inferred
from the Tapia court's failure to note otherwise. Specifically, then, even
under a whole record review, in inquiring whether substantial evidence
exists, New Mexico courts would generally apply a presumption that the
administrative decision is correct. 63 This precludes the court from substituting its judgment for that of the decision-maker ' and from weighing
the evidence. 65
[Note: Subsequent to this Survey year and shortly before this article
went to press, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Duke City Lumber
Company v. New Mexico EnvironmentalImprovement Board, No. 15,078
(Nov. 23, 1983). The court adopted the whole record standard of review
for appeals from all administrative agency decisions, while at the same
time reaffirming the legal residuum rule. In its decision, the court erroneously framed the application of the whole record standard to agency
decisions in stating that whole record review does not mandate viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to support the agency's findings.
This statement is clearly incorrect. See New Mexico Human Services
Department v. Garcia, 94 N.M. 175, 608 P.2d 151 (1980). The decision
effectively holds administrative agencies to a standard of reliance in their
decision-making which is more stringent than that applied to courts. At
the same time, the same agencies are denied the presumptions on appeal
which support judicial decisions. At this writing, motions for rehearing
have not been acted upon by the court.]
62. "The court shall set aside a decision and order of the director only if found to be: ... (2)
not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-3-4(F)
(1978).
63. Frazier v. Department of Human Serv., 98 N.M. 98, 99-100, 645 P.2d 454, 456 (Ct. App.
1982).
64. State of N.M. ex rel. Highway Dep't v. Silva, 98 N.M. 549, 555, 650 P.2d 833, 839 (Ct.
App. 1982).
65. Frazier v. Department of Human Serv., 98 N.M. 98, 100, 645 P.2d 454, 455-56 (Ct. App.
1982).
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3. Questions of Law
In reviewing questions of law previously decided by an administrative
agency, the reviewing court may freely examine and interpret the law
without according a presumption to the agency determination of legal
questions.66 Propositions of law not raised in the trial court, however,
generally cannot be considered on appeal.67 In New Mexico Department
of Human Services v. Tapia,68 the supreme court followed this doctrine
in criticizing the court of appeals for having raised legal issues sua sponte,
"without the benefit of briefs or arguments on appeal." 69 The court reiterated the exceptions to the rule as follows: (1) jurisdictional questions
may be raised for the first time on appeal; (2) questions of a general
public nature affecting the interest of the state at large may be determined
by the court without having been raised below; and (3) the court will
determine propositions not raised in the trial court where it is necessary
to do so in order to protect the fundamental rights of the party.7" The
court then explained that these exceptions apply in very few cases and
must be applied with restraint lest they swallow the rule.7'
A case discussing many issues involved in the scope and standards of
ju'dicial review and noteworthy for its dissent is Chavez v. Employment
Security Commission.72 The supreme court reversed the district court's
decision to uphold the Employment Security Commission on the issue
of whether substantial evidence supported the decision that appellant was
discharged from her employment for misconduct.7 3 The court stated that
whether the judgment of the district court was based on substantial evidence depends on whether there is a residuum of legally competent evidence in the record which would support a verdict in a court of law.74
After discussing the evidence, the court concluded that, viewing the
record as a whole, there was no legally competent evidence showing that
appellant was guilty of misconduct because the evidence supporting the
ESC was hearsay.75 The court then concluded:
Our assessment of appellant's own statement quoted above, said by
66. See, e.g., Chavez v. Employment Security Comm'n, 98 N.M. 462, 649 P.2d 1375 (1982).
67. New Mexico Dep't of Human Serv. v. Tapia, 97 N.M. 632, 642 P.2d 1091 (1982) (citing
Sais v. City Electric Co., 26 N.M. 66, 188 P. 1110 (1920)).
68. 97 N.M. 632, 642 P.2d 1091 (1982).
69.. Id. at 634, 642 P.2d at 1093.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 98 N.M. 462, 649 P.2d 1375 (1982).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 463, 649 P.2d at 1376 (citing Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 5, 462 P.2d 139
(1969)). See note 41 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 50-52.
75. 98 N.M. at 464, 649 P.2d at 1377.
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appellees to show that she was warned, is that the statement only
shows that appellant thought she was not given her Christmas bonus
because she was not present at the company Christmas party. The
statement quoted above is inadequate to show that appellant was
actually warned about excessive absenteeism.76
It is clear from this language that although the court said it was applying
the substantial evidence rule, and in other cases has said that it does not
weigh the evidence in applying this rule, 77 the court, in fact, weighed
the evidence here.
The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Easley, concurred in by Justice
Payne, took issue with the majority's scope of review, including the
application of the legal residuum rule and its weighing of the evidence.7 8
The dissent quoted the scope of review of ESC decisions set out in Wilson
v. Employment Security Commission79 and Sandoval v. Department of
Employment Security.8" Justice Easley explained that under these cases,
the decision of the Commission is entitled to all the presumptions on
appeal of all other cases and to the applications of the substantial evidence
standard.8 The dissent stated that the appellate court's function was to
review the evidence considered by the lower court, not to weigh it.82 The
dissent went on to assert that the district court's decision is entitled to
the presumption on appeal that all intendments and presumptions will be
resolved against appellants in favor of proceedings in the trial court. The
dissent criticized the majority's opinion for not adhering to the usual
presumptions and the substantial evidence standard, and for reevaluating
and weighing the evidence. The dissent's analysis was correct.
The majority's finding of lack of substantial trial evidence, because
the ESC's position was supported by hearsay, also was strongly criticized
by the dissent. The dissent stated that inasmuch as the ruling was controlled by the legal residuum rule, the rule was incorrectly applied here. 83
Although the import of this dissent is unclear, especially because the two
dissenting justices have left the court, the case is useful for an analysis
of the different applications of the scope of review.

76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Baca v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 98 N.M. 617, 651 P.2d 1261 (1982).
78. 98 N.M. at 464, 649 P.2d at 1377. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
79. 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1963).
80. 96 N.M. 717, 634 P.2d 1269 (1981).
81. 98 N.M. at 465, 649 P.2d at 1378.
82. Id. (citing Duke City Lumber Co. v. Terrell, 88 N.M. 299, 540 P.2d 229 (1975)).
83. 98 N.M. at 465, 649 P.2d at 1379. For a discussion of this aspect of the dissent, see supra
notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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4. Removal from the State Corporation Commission: The
Constitutional Standard
Three cases during the Survey year reached the supreme court on
removal from the State Corporation Commission. In each case, the court
discussed its unique role in reviewing these removed cases. The first case
is General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Corporation Commission.84 General Telephone filed an application with the State Corporation Commission for a rate increase in the amount of $2.2 million. In
its decision, the SCC allowed an increase of only $694,000. General
Telephone then filed a petition for an order of removal to the supreme
court. The scope of review for cases removed from the SCC is determined
by the New Mexico Constitution, article XI, section 7. That section
provides that upon removal of an SCC proceeding to the supreme court,
the supreme court may require or authorize additional evidence." The
constitution also gives the court power to decide these cases on their
merits .6
This function is extremely unusual for a reviewing court87 in that it
allows the appellate court to arrive at a result in accordance with the
preponderance of the evidence. 88 In General Telephone, the court explained that although it weighs the evidence, it is not a ratemaking body
and does not have the power or authority to determine a fair rate of return.
The court, therefore, after weighing the evidence, determines whether
the order of the SCC is just and reasonable. After an independent deter89
mination based on the evidence adduced at the hearing before the SCC,
if the court does not find the order to be just and reasonable, it remands
the matter to the SCC for further proceedings consistent with the court's
independent determination.'
In Mountain States Telegraph and Telephone Company v. Corporation
Commission,9 the court stated that it believed the proper scope of review
upon removal from the Corporation Commission is clear: the court may
decide the case on the merits without indulging in any presumptions. The
court went on to explain the rule by stating that the SCC's order will not
84. 98 N.M. 749, 652 P.2d 1200 (1982).
85. See Seward v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 17 N.M. 557, 581, 131 P. 980, 988 (1913),
where the court stated, "in no case does the constitution contemplate the taking of additional evidence
in the Supreme Court, but as has been said, in a proper case, the cause will be referred back to the
Commission for such purpose."
86. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 97 N.M. 424, 640.P.2d
924 (1982).
87. In re Donaldo A. Martinez, Dist. Judge, 99 N.M. 198, 656 P.2d 861 (1982).
88. N.M. Const. art. XI, § 7.
89. 98 N.M. 749 at 753, 652 P.2d 1200 at 1204.
90. Id.
91. 99 N.M. 1, 653 P.2d 501 (1982).

Winter 1984]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

be disturbed if supported by satisfactory and substantial evidence.9 2 It
further elucidated this standard by stating that the term "satisfactory" is
crucial to the test because it implies a weighing procedure, so that even
if substantial evidence supports the SCC's ruling, the court may weigh
the evidence and make a decision contrary to the SCC's order.93
IV. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico courts have decided significant issues of administrative law during the past Survey year. Generally the decisions are working
to clarify and expand the law. The court's pronouncement regarding the
prior notice restrictions on an agency's power to change its policy, as
announced in General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Corporation Commission,94 however, should be reconsidered this coming year.
The Duke City Lumber Company95 opinion, decided in 1983, should
be consulted by practitioners for its effect on the substantial evidence test
outlined in Baca v. Employment Services Division of the Human Services
Departmentof New Mexico96 and on the legal residuum rule as employed
in Chavez v. Employment Security Commission.97

92. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 99 N.M. 1, 653 P.2d
501 (1982). See also the third case issued this year, Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 97 N.M. 424, 640 P.2d 924 (1982).
93. 99 N.M. at 1, 653 P.2d at 501 (citing State Corp. Comm'n v. Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Co., 58 N.M. 260, 267, 270 P.2d 685, 689 (1954)), quoting San Juan C & C Co.
v. S.F., S.J. & NRY. Co., 35 N.M. 512, 2 P.2d 308 (1931).
94. 98 N.M. 749, 652 P.2d 1200 (1982).
95. 22 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1362 (Dec. 22, 1983).
96. 98 N.M. 617, 651 P.2d 1261 (1982).
97. 98 N.M. 462, 649 P.2d 1375 (1982).

